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Abstract
We characterise the interplay between ¯rms' decisions in product development, be it joint
or independent, and their ensuing repeated price behaviour, either collusive or Bertrand-
Nash. Firms face a choice between participating in a joint venture inventing a single
product, and in independent ventures developing their respective products which can be
either horizontally or vertically di®erentiated. We prove that joint product development
and the resulting lack of horizontal product di®erentiation may destabilise collusion, whilst
¯rms' R&D decisions have no bearings on collusive stability in the vertical di®erentiation
setting. We also discover the non-monotone dependence of ¯rms' venture decisions at
the development stage upon their intertemporal preferences, as well as upon consumers'
willingness to pay.
Keywords : R&D, product innovation, collusive stability, time discount factor, optimal
punishment.
JEL classi¯cation : D43, L13, O31.
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1 Introduction
Whilst public authorities explicitly prohibit collusive market behaviour, there is scarce
evidence that they discourage cooperation in R&D activities. As to the latter, there
indeed exist several examples of policy measures meant to stimulate the formation of
research joint ventures (RJVs henceforth).1 If cooperation in innovation activities may
induce collusion in the product market, then the above mentioned tendency to encourage
cooperative R&D but to discourage market collusion will render itself inconsistent.
There exists a wide literature concerning the e®ects of product di®erentiation on the
stability of implicit collusion either in output levels or in prices (Deneckere, 1983 ; Chang,
1991, 1992 ; Rothschild, 1992 ; Ross, 1992 ; Friedman and Thisse, 1993 ; HÄackner, 1994,
1995, 1996 ; Lambertini, 1997a ; Albk and Lambertini, 1998 ; inter alia). There also have
been studies dealing with R&D in di®erentiated markets. A few of them, including Motta
(1992) and Rosenkranz (1995), consider cooperation in the development phase. On the
other hand, the e®ectiveness of RJVs in eliminating e®ort duplication has been well noted
in a large number of contributions (Katz, 1986 ; d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988, 1990 ;
Kamien et al., 1992 ; Suzumura, 1992 ; inter alia).
So far, however, few serious attempts have been made to consolidate these two streams
of research. Among these few pioneering studies are Martin (1995), and Cabral (1996).
The former analyses the strategic e®ects of an RJV aimed at achieving a process innova-
tion for an existing product, when the product is marketed by ¯rms engaging in Cournot
behaviour. Martin shows that the presence of cooperation in process innovation enhances
cartel stability, which can overbalance the welfare advantage of eliminating e®ort dupli-
cation through the RJV. His ¯nding has potential implications in the case of product
innovation as well. Cabral, on the other hand, proves the existence of those cases where
competitive pricing is needed to sustain more e±cient R&D agreements.
Our e®ort in this paper broadly follows Martin's, except that we take into account
the possible e®ects of product di®erentiation resulting from the presence or the absence
of cooperation in product development, as opposed to Martin's analysis of process de-
velopment. In particular, unlike most of the existing literature on repeated games under
product di®erentiation, we explicitly model the e®ort-saving e®ects of RJVs, which a®ect
¯rms' incentives as well as social welfare. Namely, in an RJV, ¯rms share the costs of
product development by jointly developing a single product. An RJV thereby eliminates
e®ort duplication, whilst it o®ers no product di®erentiation : all participant ¯rms will
1See the National Cooperative Research Act in the US ; EC Commission (1990) ; and, for Japan, Goto
and Wakasugi (1988).
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have to market one identical product. Independent ventures do the opposite : each ¯rm
bears the full costs of innovating its respective product, in return for the possibility of
product di®erentiation.
In brief, we investigate the bearings of product innovation, either through an RJV or
through independent ventures, on ¯rms' ability to build an implicit cartel in the market
phase and maintain it over time. We prove that ¯rms' R&D decisions, insofar as they
a®ect the degree of vertical di®erentiation only, have no bearings on collusion stability.
Horizontally di®erentiated independent ventures can enhance the sustainability of price
collusion in marketing if ¯rms collude by choosing that subgame perfect equilibrium which
maximises the sum of ¯rms' discounted streams of pro¯ts.
Note also that ¯rms' decision between joint and independent ventures at the devel-
opment stage can be non-monotone in their intertemporal preferences as well as in con-
sumers' willingness to pay, due to the fact that the collusive stability in the marketing
stage can be a®ected by product di®erentiation.
The paper is organised as follows. The general structure of the game is laid out in
section 2. The horizontal di®erentiation setting is closely analysed in sections 3. Then,
the vertical di®erentiation model is discussed in section 4. Section 5 discusses brie°y the
di®erence between our ¯ndings and existing results in the literature. Finally, Section 6
provides concluding remarks.
2 The model
We consider a duopoly with two a priori identical ¯rms playing the following three-stage
game. The entire game is embedded in the discrete time structure t = 0; 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢. The
¯rst two stages take place at t = 0 , both are for product innovation in its broad sense.
The ¯rst stage is for initial venture decisions, where ¯rms choose between independent
and joint ventures. An RJV is formed if and only if both ¯rms agree to stay in it ;
otherwise if at least one of them disagrees with an RJV, then each of the two ¯rms forms
an independent venture.
The second stage describes product development. Products are located in the relevant
space, which we assume to be unidimensional. Depending upon whether such a space is
horizontal or vertical, we discuss two separate versions of the model in sections 3 and 4,
respectively. In either version :
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² The two ¯rms jointly develop a single product if they decided on a joint venture in
the previous stage. The joint venture serves as a uni¯ed decision maker only in this
second stage. Namely, the RJV chooses a product so as to maximise the sum of the
two ¯rms' discounted streams of pro¯ts. The two ¯rms also bear symmetrically the
cost of product development.
² Each of the two ¯rms independently chooses a product and develops it if the two
¯rms decided on independent ventures in the ¯rst stage. In this case, each ¯rm bears
the full development cost of its own product. Note in particular, the noncoopera-
tiveness of the ¯rms' product decisions does not necessarily preclude the possibility
that their decisions can still be implicitly collusive, rewarding or penalising partic-
ular product pro¯les through their ensuing market behaviour.
Then ¯nally, the third stage is a Bertrand supergame t = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢. Throughout the game,
the discount factor ± 2 [0; 1) is common to both ¯rms. In establishing the critical threshold
of the discount factor stabilising price collusion, we follow the optimal punishment strategy
as de¯ned by Abreu (1986).
Observe that, when ¯rms choose a joint venture, they supply the market with an
undi®erentiated product, thereby to sustain collusion in the resulting perfect Bertrand
market, the discount factor ± needs to be
1
2
or above. In this case, the predictions o®ered
by the conventional folk theorem and by Abreu's optimal punishment coincide (Lambson,
1987). If ± <
1
2
, there is no prospect of colluding at any prices other than one-shot
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices.
On the other hand, when ¯rms choose independent ventures, their collusive or non-
collusive pricing behaviour in the Bertrand supergame can be made contingent upon the
product portfolio they have selected. By colluding in marketing if and only if a partic-
ular product portfolio 1¤; 2¤ has been selected (i.e., ¯rm 1 has chosen product 1¤ and
¯rm 2 has chosen 2¤), ¯rms may be able to sustain the particular product pro¯le as part
of a subgame perfect equilibrium. Obviously, depending upon which product portfolio
to sustain, there can be countlessly many subgame perfect equilibria of this structure.
Among them, we focus on pro¯t e±cient ones, i.e., those equilibria yielding the highest
possible discounted pro¯ts (greater details shall be shown in sections 3 and 4). Thereby,
even though their product decisions as well as pricing actions are entirely noncooperative,
the ¯rms can e®ectively collude both in product portfolio and in the ensuing Bertrand
supergame, as an outcome of a purely noncooperative subgame perfect equilibrium.
Hence, a general picture of the decision problem facing the two ¯rms is provided by
¯gure 1, where the discounted stream of net pro¯ts for each ¯rm is listed as (JC) , (JN) ,
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(IC) , and (IN ), with J; I; C and N standing for joint venture, independent ventures, col-
lusion and one-shot Bertrand-Nash behaviour, respectively. In the picture, the sub-trees
for the supergame in the third stage are suppressed and replaced with binary equilibrium
outcomes : either collusion or Bertrand-Nash.2 ki is the development cost of product i .
Note that both collusive pro¯ts and Bertrand-Nash pro¯ts vary depending upon the
product portfolio. In the case of undi®erentiated products, Bertrand-Nash pro¯ts are nil,
and in calculating collusive pro¯ts ¼Ci we assume that the two ¯rms will set an identical
price to split demand evenly, thereby equalising pro¯ts, when colluding in prices. In
independent ventures, ¯rms collude in prices and earn collusive pro¯ts ¼Ci¤ if and only if
collusive portfolio 1¤; 2¤ has been chosen ; otherwise they repeat one-shot Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium, earning ¼Ni which depends upon the portfolio. Let ±
¤ denote the critical
discount factor sustaining collusion, which may depend upon the given pair of products.
Figure 1 : the generic decision tree.
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In the following two sections we solve this tree backward to identify pure strategy subgame
perfect equilibrium (simply \equilibrium" hereinafter unless otherwise speci¯ed).
2Note that our purpose in this paper is to analyse ¯rms' R&D and marketing behaviour without mixing
them with entry/exit decisions. To this end, we assume no possibility of exiting even when operative
pro¯ts are literally below zero. This can be justi¯ed, for example, in the presence of substantial exit
costs.
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3 The horizontal di®erentiation setting
We adopt the spatial location model due to d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979).
Consumers are uniformly distributed over the unit line segment [0; 1] . In every period,
each consumer buys one unit of the product that maximises his net utility :
U = s¡ di2 ¡ pi;
where s is gross surplus, pi is the price charged by ¯rm i and di is the distance between
the consumer and ¯rm i. We assume that, if a consumer is indi®erent between the two
¯rms' products, then he randomises his purchase with probability one half from each ¯rm.
This implies that, if the two ¯rms locate at the same site and choose the same price, then
they split the demand evenly. We also assume s ¸ 5=4 ,3 and normalise the marginal
production cost to nil.
The development cost of a product is a positive constant k independent of the location.
Therefore, an RJV pays k jointly, each ¯rm bearing k=2 , whereas an independent venture
also pays k in the second stage, at t = 0 .
The game is solved by backward induction in the following subsections 3:1 through 3:3.
3.1 Subgame ensuing independent ventures
When ¯rms undertake independent ventures, each of them bears the full development
cost k . Although the two ¯rms' location choices are mutually independent and non-
cooperative, as aforementioned, they may still be able to enforce a particular pair of loca-
tions using their ensuing marketing behaviour as a rewarding/punishing device. Namely,
in the marketing supergame, ¯rms collude in prices only if they have chosen a prescribed
pair of locations. Especially, when there are more than one pair of locations enforceable
by this means, hereinafter we analyse the most pro¯t-e±cient symmetric one among such
location pairs.
In this horizontal product space setting we assume that, if in the ¯rst stage the two
¯rms choose independent ventures, then in the latter two stages they play that subgame
perfect equilibrium which prescribes the following.
1. The most pro¯table symmetric pro¯le of locations and prices, as long as ± is su±-
ciently high in order to sustain such a pro¯le through Abreu's optimal punishment.
3This ensures that full market coverage obtains at the noncooperative one-shot equilibrium in prices,
if ¯rms locate in 0 and 1, respectively.
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2. If ± does not su±ce to sustain the above 1., then the most pro¯table among those
symmetric location pairs starting from which the collusion at the joint pro¯t maxi-
mal (i.e., monopoly) price level is sustainable by Abreu's optimal punishment given
± .
3. If the set of all those symmetric location pairs in 2. is empty, i.e., if ± is so low that
collusion at the monopoly price is unsustainable starting from any location pair
at all, then the most pro¯table location pair anticipating one-shot Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium pricing.
Let ±[s] de¯ne the critical threshold between cases 1 and 2, and ±[s] the threshold
between cases 2 and 3, respectively. Then :
Lemma 1 :
1. When ± ¸ ±[s] , ¯rms locate at 1
4
;
3
4
and price at s¡ 1
16
.
2. When ±[s] · ± · ±[s] , ¯rms locate at such location a and 1¡ a that ± = ±¤, where
a decreases in s .
3. When ± < ±[s] , ¯rms locate at endpoints 0 and 1 and play the related one-shot
equilibrium price.
4. 0 · ±[s] < ±[s] < 1
2
for any s ¸ 5
4
, where the equality holds only when s =
5
4
.
Proof : See appendix 7.1. It is algebraically straightforward to verify that, whenever
± ¸ ±[s] , each ¯rm has no strict incentive to deviate in location and endure the one-
shot Nash equilibrium outcome later, as opposed to complying with the prescribed
location and colluding later.
The reason why a 2 (1=4; 1=2] does not occur is because the critical threshold for cartel
stability is increasing in a , while cartel pro¯ts are the same for any a = 1=4 § " , with
" 2 [0; 1=4] . Therefore, it is convenient for ¯rms to relocate farther apart and increase
di®erentiation, rather than the opposite (see also HÄackner, 1995; 1996).
3.2 Subgame ensuing a joint venture
Turn now to the case of a joint venture. Observe that location is no longer a strate-
gic instrument for each ¯rm, since the two ¯rms commit to develop an identical prod-
uct, locating at the same point in the product space. The game thereby reduces into a
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straightforward Bertrand supergame, where the critical threshold of the discount factor is
1/2. As a consequence, the choice between Bertrand-Nash and collusive pricing depends
exclusively on ¯rms' time preferences.
If ± 2 [1=2; 1) , the two ¯rms' joint collusive pro¯ts are maximised when they together
locate at 1=2 , entailing the pro¯t ¼Ci = (s ¡ 1=4)=2 per ¯rm, per period. Otherwise, if
± 2 [0; 1=2), Bertrand-Nash pro¯ts are nil irrespective of the ¯rms' location in the product
space as long as their products are undi®erentiated. Notice that this involves a loss, equal
to half the development cost, for each ¯rm. The option to stay out is assumed away,
namely, the initial investment is thought of as irreversible and ¯rms can avoid loosing it
if and only if (JN) is not the equilibrium outcome.
3.3 Initial venture decisions
>From the above Lemma 1, we have observed that, after independent ventures ¯rms can
collude whenever ± ¸ ±¤, whereas after a joint venture they can collude when and only
when ± ¸ 1=2 . Therefore, item 4 of Lemma 1 immediately proves the following.
Proposition I : The range of time discount factors over which price collusion ensuing
a joint venture is sustainable is a proper subset of that where collusion ensuing
independent ventures is sustainable.
In plain words, a joint venture, when it hinders horizontal product di®erentiation, serves
to destabilise price collusion in the marketing supergame.
The resulting discounted pro¯ts per ¯rm appear as in Figure 2.
Figure 2 : Discounted pro¯ts per ¯rm, horizontal product space.
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where
a¤(±) =
8>><>>:
1
4
if ± 2
h
±[s] ; 1
´
;
arg
a f± = ±¤ j sg if ± 2
h
±[s] ; ±[s]
´
:
The dependence of ¯rms' innovative venture decisions on the time discount factor ±, the
gross surplus s and the development cost k is identi¯ed by the following proposition, using
a three-regime taxonomy based upon the level of time preferences.
Proposition II :
1. ± 2
h
0 ; ±[s]
´
. In this regime, ¯rms repeat the one-shot Bertrand-Nash equilibrium
under both independent and joint venture cases. Therefore, the joint venture is
chosen over independent ventures if and only if (JN) ¸ (IN) , i.e.
k >
±
1¡ ± : (1)
2. ± 2
h
±[s] ; ±[s]
´
. In this regime, ¯rms collude in prices only under independent
ventures, not if they undertake a joint venture. Hence, the joint venture is preferred
if and only if (JN) > (IC) , i.e.
k >
±
1¡ ±
µ
s¡ 1
4
+ a¤(±) (1¡ a¤(±))
¶
: (2)
3. ± 2
h
±[s] ; 1
´
. In this regime, ¯rms always collude. As a result, the joint venture is
undertaken if and only if (JC) > (IC) , i.e.
k >
±
1¡ ±a
¤(±) (1¡ a¤(±))
which, noting that a¤(±) =
1
4
in this range of ± , can be rewritten into
k >
3±
16(1¡ ±) : (3)
Figure 3 plots the venture cost k against the discount factor ± , given s . Overall, inde-
pendent ventures tend to become increasingly attractive as ± grows. However, in regime
2, the condition for independent venture is loosened (inequality (2)) as compared to the
adjacent areas (inequality conditions (1) and (3)). The driving force is the fact that when
± lies in this regime, ¯rms can sustain collusion if and only if they have chosen inde-
pendent ventures. Observe that the ¯rms' indi®erence threshold in k between joint and
independent ventures is monotone in their time preferences over the interval ± 2 [0; 1=2),
as well as over the interval ± 2 [1=2; 1):
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Figure 3 : Comparative statics on ¯rms' venture decisions
in the parametric plane f±; kg .
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Consider now the relation between s and ± , given k . Figure 4 plots the gross surplus s
against the discount factor ± , given the venture cost k . Once again, independent ventures
become more pro¯table in regime 2 relative to the adjacent areas. When k >
3
16
, the
boundary (3) lies to the right of H. Also, when k <
19
16
, the boundary (2) intersects with
the boundary s =
5
4
at L to the left of H. Thus, as long as
3
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19
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, ¯rms' venture
decisions are non-monotone in ± for any s ¸ 5
4
.
Figure 4 : Comparative statics on ¯rms' venture decisions
in the parametric plane f±; sg .
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Finally, Figure 5 plots the venture cost k against the gross surplus s . Here, ¯rms' indif-
ference boundary between joint and independent ventures shifts up as ± increases from 0
to 1/2. The horizontal portion to the right of the kinks correspond to regime 1, and the
up-sloping portion to the left of the kinks correspond to regimes 2 (the kinked locus is
meant to represent a generic ± 2 (0; 1=2) ). The boundary jumps down when ± reaches
1/2 ; thereafter, parallely shifts up again as ± increases further from 1/2 to 1 (regime 3).
This discontinuity re°ects the fact that as ± exits regime 2 and enters regime s, the extra
bene¯t of collusive stability o®ered by product di®erentiation becomes no longer relevant.
Figure 5 : Firms' indi®erence boundary between joint and independent
ventures, drawn on a cost (k) - bene¯t (s) plane given ± .
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Note that these observations imply the following.
Corollary i : For any given k; s such that
3
16
< k < s¡ 1
16
;
¯rms' decisions between joint and independent ventures become non-monotone in
the discount factor ± .
Corollary ii : For any given k; ± such that
±
1¡ ± < k <
±
1¡ ±
µ
arg
s f±[s] = ±g ¡
1
4
¶
;
¯rms' venture decisions are non-monotone in the gross surplus s .
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4 The vertical di®erentiation setting
We adopt a model of vertical di®erentiation in the vein of Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979),
Shaked and Sutton (1982), inter alia. A unit mass of consumers are uniformly distributed
over the interval [0;£] , representing their marginal willingness to pay for quality. Each
consumer buys at most one unit of the product that maximises his net utility :
U = µqi ¡ pi ; µ 2 [0;£] ;
where qi and pi identify the quality and the price of product i . The market is supplied by
two single-product ¯rms producing qualities q1; q2 2 (0; q] , where q is the highest quality
level which is technologically feasible. Without loss of generality we assume q1 ¸ q2
throughout this section. Also, if a consumer is indi®erent between the two ¯rms' products,
then he randomises his purchase with probability one half from each ¯rm. This implies
that, if the two ¯rms' qualities and prices are identical, then they split the market evenly.
We assume4
±
8(1¡ ±) £q > k1 ¡ k2 (4)
and also that the marginal production cost is nil.
The development cost of a product is a non-decreasing function of its quality in the
following way. The cost of product innovation is a constant k1 if it is the highest quality
being produced. Otherwise, the development cost is k2 2 (0; k1) . This describes the
economic situation where there is a unilateral externality that the technology adopted by
a high-quality ¯rm can be partially imitated by a lower-quality ¯rm, but not vice versa.5
This naturally implies that, if a joint venture is undertaken, each ¯rm bears k1=2 .
The game can be solved backward, similarly to section 3.
4.1 Subgame ensuing independent ventures
We assume equilibrium selection criteria mostly analogous to those in our horizontal
di®erentiation setting (see section 3.1) except that, by the nature of vertical di®erentiation,
4This assumption, that the total surplus £q is su±ciently high, is somewhat parallel to the assumption
s ¸ 5
4
in the horizontal di®erentiation model (section 3), even though full market coverage is no longer
guaranteed in the vertical di®erentiation model. See appendix 7.2 for computational details.
5This is observationally equivalent to a perhaps more intuitive assumption that a ¯rst entrant must
innovate a product from scratch, paying k1 , whilst a subsequent entrant can innovate a product on
the ground of its predecessor's technological heritage, saving the development cost down to k2 where
0 < k2 < k1 . See Lemma 2-ii in appendix 7.3.
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¯rms' product portfolio is not \symmetric" unless they produce an identical quality.
Namely, if in the ¯rst stage the two ¯rms choose independent ventures, then in the lat-
ter two stages they play that subgame perfect equilibrium which prescribes the following.
1. The pro¯le of qualities and prices which maximises the two ¯rms' aggregate pro¯ts,
as long as ± is su±ciently high in order to sustain such a pro¯le through Abreu's
optimal punishment.
2. If ± does not su±ce to sustain the above 1., then the most pro¯table among those
quality pairs starting from which the collusion at the joint pro¯t maximal (i.e.,
monopoly) price level is sustainable by Abreu's optimal punishment given ± .
3. If the set of all those symmetric location pairs in 2. is empty, i.e., if ± is so low
that collusion at the monopoly price is unsustainable starting from any quality pair
at all, then the most pro¯table quality pair anticipating one-shot Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium pricing.
Our ¯ndings in this vertical di®erentiation setting is qualitatively quite distinct from
those in the horizontal product space in several ways. In particular, item 2. in the above
taxonomy turns out to be vacuous.
Lemma 2 :
² If ± ¸ 1
2
, both ¯rms develop q in the second stage, and collude in prices in the
ensuing marketing stage.
² If ± < 1
2
, then q1 = q , q2 =
4
7
q followed by Bertrand-Nash competition in the
marketing stage, is the unique (up to the two ¯rms' permutation) pure strategy
equilibrium.
Proof : See appendix 7.2.
4.2 Subgame ensuing a joint venture
In the case of a joint venture, the quality is no longer a strategic variable for each ¯rm.
The two ¯rms commit to develop an identical product, which reduces the subgame into a
simple Bertrand supergame without product di®erentiation, where the critical threshold
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of the discount factor is 1/2 in order to sustain price collusion. The choice between the
one-shot Bertrand-Nash equilibrium and collusive pricing thereby depends solely upon
¯rms' time preferences.
If ± 2 [0; 1=2), the one-shot Bertrand-Nash equilibrium pro¯ts are nil irrespective of
the ¯rms' location in the product space as long as their products are undi®erentiated.
Otherwise, if ± 2 [1=2; 1) , the two ¯rms' joint collusive pro¯ts are maximised as follows.
Lemma 3 : If ¯rms engage in a joint venture anticipating price collusion in the market
supergame, then both ¯rms develop q in the second stage. Collusion is sustainable
i® ± ¸ 1=2 .
Proof : Step 1 of appendix 7.2, except that each ¯rm's initial R&D expense is no
longer k1 but now
k1
2
instead, proves Lemma 3.
4.3 Initial venture decisions
Lemmata 2 and 3 imply :
Proposition III : The critical threshold of the discount factor in sustaining price col-
lusion is always ±¤ = 1=2 irrespective of ¯rms' initial venture decisions.
The relevant per period pro¯ts when ¯rms adopt independent ventures and compete ¶a la
Bertrand-Nash are ¼N1 = 7£q=48 and ¼
N
2 = £q=48 . Obviously, if ¯rms undertake a joint
venture and then play Bertrand-Nash, their stage pro¯ts in the marketing supergame are
nil. Otherwise, if ¯rms collude in prices, their individual per period pro¯t is ¼Ci = £q=8 ,
irrespective of their venture decisions. Hence the discounted pro¯ts are summarised in
Figure 6.
Figure 6 : Discounted pro¯ts per ¯rm, vertical product space.
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Clearly, if ± 2 [1=2; 1) , ¯rms are going to collude anyway, so that the venture decisions
have no relevance as to the quality that is going to be marketed. Otherwise, when ± 2
[0; 1=2) , we assume that ¯rms choose independent ventures if and only if they fail to agree
on a joint venture at q , in which case the ¯rm who disagrees switches to a quality strictly
lower than q .
Proposition IV :
1. ± 2 [0; 1=2) . In this regime, ¯rms are unable to collude in prices. Hence, the
relevant comparison involves Bertrand-Nash competition with either a joint venture
or independent ventures. Therefore, independent ventures take place if and only if
(IN) ¸ (JN) for the lower quality ¯rm (due to the above assumption), i.e.
±
1¡ ± ¢
£q
48
¡ k2 ¸ ¡ k1
2
: (5)
2. ± 2 [1=2; 1) . In this regime, ¯rms collude in prices regardless of their venture
decisions. Therefore, as long as the venture cost is strictly positive, a joint venture
always dominates independent ventures.
Figure 7 is a vertical-di®erentiation analogue of Figure 3, plotting the product develop-
ment cost di®erential k2 ¡ k1
2
against the discount factor ± , given the gross surplus £q .
Within the range 0 · ± < 1=2 , independent ventures tend to become more attractive as
± grows from 0 towards 1/2, according to the inequality condition (5). This re°ects the
fact that, as ¯rms become increasingly forward looking, the reduction in initial venture
costs made possible by an RJV decreases its importance. Once ± ¸ 1=2 , on the other
hand, a joint venture is unambiguously more pro¯table than independent ventures.
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Figure 7 : Comparative statics on ¯rms' venture decisions
in the parametric plane f±; k2 ¡ k1
2
g.
6
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2
1
RJV RJV
(5)
Independent
Ventures
£q
48
k2 ¡ k1
2
· ¡ ±
8(1¡ ±) £q
inadmissible under condition (4).
RJV
Turn now to the relation between £q and ± . Figure 8 plots the gross surplus £q against
the discount factor ± , given the innovation cost di®erential k2 ¡ k1
2
. Clearly from the
two diagrams in Figure 8, ¯rms' venture decisions are monotone in the total surplus £q ,
and is dependent upon £q when and only when k2 ¡ k1
2
> 0 and ± <
1
2
.
Figure 8 : Comparative statics on ¯rms' venture decisions
in the parametric plane f±;£qg
given k2 ¡ k1
2
> 0 ;
6
£q
-
0 ±11
2
48
Ã
k2 ¡ k1
2
!
(5)
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2
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¡8
Ã
k2 ¡ k1
2
!
1
2
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Finally, Figure 9 plots the venture cost di®erential k2 ¡ k1
2
against the gross surplus £q .
Here, the ¯rms' indi®erence boundary between joint and independent ventures rotates
counterclockwise as ± increases from 0 towards 1/2, according to the inequality condition
(5). Once ± reaches 1/2, condition (5) becomes irrelevant, thereby the indi®erence bound-
ary disappears. This discontinuity re°ects the fact that, once ± exceeds the threshold 1/2,
an RJV unambiguously dominates independent ventures exactly by the innovation cost
saving k1=2 (see Figure 6).
Figure 9 : Firms' indi®erence boundary between joint and independent
ventures, drawn on a cost (k2 ¡ k1
2
) - bene¯t (£q) plane given ±
when 0 · ± < 1
2
;
-£q0
6
k2 ¡ k1
2
HHHHHHHHHHHHHH (4)
Independent ventures
³³
³³
³³
³³
³³
³³
³³
³³ (5)
Independent ventures
RJV
when
1
2
· ± < 1 .
6
k2 ¡ k1
2
RJV
-£q0@
@
@
@
@
@@ (4)
RJV
These observations imply the following.
Corollary iii : When 0 < k2 ¡ k1
2
<
£q
48
, ¯rms' venture decisions are non-monotone
in the discount factor ± .
5 Discussion relating to literature
5.1 Horizontal product space
Connoisseurs may have noticed that the subgame ensuing independent ventures in the
horizontal product space reminds Friedman and Thisse (1993). Our observation in Lemma
1, which also a®ects Propositions I, II and Corollaries i, ii, is nevertheless dissimilar to
Friedman and Thisse. The reason is as follows. The key di®erence between their analysis
and ours is the timing when collusive behaviour commences.
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Friedman and Thisse stands on the assumption (or, in other words, equilibrium selec-
tion criterion) that, in the marketing supergame, ¯rms collude in prices so as to maximise
their joint pro¯ts given any location pair they have chosen. Based upon this premise,
back in the second stage, each ¯rm locates according to individual incentives. Thereby
any location decision is not subject to punishment through pricing behaviour. In this
sense, collusive behaviour does not commence until the third (marketing) stage.
In our paper, on the contrary, we focus on such equilibria that, if a ¯rm deviates from
the prescribed location in the second stage, then both ¯rms compete in marketing by
playing the one-shot Bertrand-Nash equilibrium every marketing period. This serves as a
punishment against the location deviation. In this sense, collusive behaviour commences
in the second (location) stage onwards. The reason why we consider this class of equilibria
is because this can entail a more pro¯t-e±cient subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.6
If we applied a similar analysis to Friedman and Thisse, then our results would be
altered accordingly. Firstly, Lemma 1 would be replaced with the following.
Lemma 1* :
² When ± ¸ 1
2
, the two ¯rms' equilibrium locations coincide at
1
2
, and in the mar-
keting stage, ¼Ci =
1
2
µ
s¡ 1
4
¶
so as to maximise joint pro¯ts between the two ¯rms.
² Otherwise, when ± < 1
2
, they locate at the endpoints of the unit segment and play
the one-shot Bertrand-Nash equilibrium at each t 2 [1;1) .
It is algebraically straightforward to verify that this result, including the critical discount
factor ±¤ =
1
2
, stands una®ected by the di®erence in penal codes to sustain price collusion
| one-shot Nash reversion in Friedman and Thisse, and Abreu's optimal punishment in
our analysis.7 Also see d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) as for the second half
of Lemma 1*.
Consequently, Propositions I, II and Figures 2, 3 would be replaced with the following.
6One might argue that our punishment scheme against location deviations is not renegotiation proof.
Note in general, however, that any punishment using pricing behaviour as an enforcement device, is
renegotiation disproof, whether it is against location deviation or price deviation. Hence we ¯nd no
reason why location decisions cannot be collusive.
7These two penal schemes o®er the same critical discount factor in a Bertrand supergame when
products are perfect substitutes (i.e., located at the same point). See Lambertini and Sasaki (1998).
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Proposition I* : The range of time discount factors over which the price collusion in
the binary equilibrium is sustainable is ± 2 [1=2; 1] irrespective of ¯rms' venture
decisions in the ¯rst stage.
Figure 2* : discounted pro¯ts per ¯rm, horizontal product space.
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4
¶
¡ k
2
Bertrand Nash (JN)
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2
Proposition II* :
² ± 2 [0; 1=2) . In this regime, ¯rms are unable to collude. Hence, a joint venture is
preferred if and only if (JN ) > (IN ); i.e., if k >
±
1¡ ± .
² ± 2 [1=2; 1) . In this regime, ¯rms always collude. As a result, since a joint venture
has a cost-saving e®ect vis µa vis independent ventures, while both choices ensure
the same stream of operative (collusive) pro¯ts, a joint venture is always preferred.
Figure 3* : Comparative statics on ¯rms' venture decisions
in the parametric plane f±; kg .
-
±
6
k
1
0
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b± 11
2
k =
±
1¡ ±
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Independent
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Note in particular that the dependence of ¯rms' innovative venture decisions on the gross
surplus s would disappear if we assumed against collusion in location as Friedman and
Thisse does. Hence Corollary ii would disappear, and Corollary i would be altered as
follows.
Corollary i* : For any given k 2 (0; 1) , ¯rms decisions between joint and independent
ventures become non-monotone in the discount factor ± .
5.2 Vertical product space
Analogously to the horizontal case, we can either allow or prohibit collusion in location
when the product space is vertical. However, the vertical di®erentiation game does not en-
tail observationally distinct outcomes between these two forms of collusion (see Appendix
7.3).
The intuitive reason why these two forms of collusion yield observationally distinct
outcomes in the horizontal di®erentiation game is because it is pro¯table to cover the
whole market, thereby it is joint pro¯t e±cient for independent ventures to locate far apart
from each other so as to cover separate parts of the horizontal segment. In the vertical
di®erentiation game, it is no longer pro¯table to cover the low end of the consumers'
distribution, so that independent ventures cannot enhance their joint collusive pro¯ts
analogously by di®erentiating away from each other.
6 Concluding remarks
We have analysed the unfolding of R&D and market behaviour of ¯rms in a possibly
di®erentiated duopoly either horizontally or vertically, alternatively. We have mapped
the e®ects of intertemporal preferences, the technology of product development and con-
sumers' willingness to pay on ¯rms' venture decisions as well as on price behaviour over
the entire parameter space.
In particular, we have learnt that the interlink between ¯rms' R&D decisions and their
prospective ability to collude in marketing hinges crutially upon the form of collusion |
more concretely, whether they are to collude in locations and prices, or in prices only.
Insofar as ¯rms are to collude whenever possible, given any product portfolio they have
chosen, the set of those discount factors under which collusion is strategically sustainable
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(± ¸ 1
2
in our model ; see section 5) stands entirely una®ected by the ¯rms' initial choice
between joint and independent ventures. This result holds in both horizontal and vertical
di®erentiation settings.
On the other hand, if the ¯rms are to collude more e±ciently, then their decisions
in product innovation may in°uence their collusive prospects, through the e®ect that
horizontal di®erentiation can enhance collusive stability. Namely, by choosing that sub-
game perfect equlibrium which prescribes price collusion only in the particular subgame
commencing from that location pair which maximises the discounted sum of the ¯rms'
total pro¯ts, the ¯rms can e®ectively enforce such a pro¯t-e±cient location pair as part
of collusive equilibrium path. This enforcement of horizontal di®erentiation enhances not
only the ¯rms' collusive pro¯ts, but also the stability of collusion by lowering the critical
discount factor. This e®ect is present only with horizontal di®erentiation ; in the vertical
di®erentiation game, there is no hope in the direction of lowering the critical discount
factor by this means.
In brief, the qualitative di®erence between horizontal and vertical product spaces, in
relation to the presence or absence of the interactive relations between ¯rms' decisions
in product innovation and their ability to sustain price collusion in the ensuing market-
ing supergame, can be attributed not entirely to the intrinsic di®erence in construction
of these two product spaces, but also largely to the way ¯rms collude in the Bertrand
supergame. It is only when ¯rms collude e±ciently that they can better stabilise price
collusion by developing horizontally, but not vertically, di®erentiated products by invest-
ing in independent ventures ; hence, the ultimate choice between joint and independent
ventures critically depends upon the trade-o® between the cost-saving e®ect of an RJV
and the pro-collusive e®ect of independent ventures. In all other cases | i.e., when ¯rms
do not punish location deviations, or when the product space is vertical, or both | the
choice between joint and independent product innovation does not involve any prospect
to stabilise price collusion in the ensuing marketing stage.
Finally, contrary to some of the earlier beliefs, we have established that the relationship
between product di®erentiation and the discount factor can indeed be non-monotone. This
seemingly counterintuitive result stems from the balance between cost consideration in
product development and ¯rms' ability to sustain future collusion, be there any interactive
forces between these two e®ects or not.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Firms 1 and 2 locate at a and 1¡ b . Without loss of generality we assume a · 1¡ b .
It is straightforward to verify that, insofar as s ¸ 5=4 , it is always pro¯table for ¯rms,
whether pricing collusively or competitively, to cover the entire market, i.e., all consumers
in [0; 1] should prefer buying to not buying.
The generic location x of the consumer who is indi®erent between the two products is
de¯ned by
s¡ (x¡ a)2 ¡ p1 = s¡ (1¡ b¡ x)2 ¡ p2 :
Whenever there is a unique x satisfying this condition, which occurs only if a < 1 ¡ b ,
the following demand system obtains :
y1 =
1¡ b+ a
2
+
p2 ¡ p1
2(1¡ b¡ a) ; y2 = 1¡ y1 :
Otherwise, if there is no such x 2 [0; 1] , one of the ¯rms will take over the whole market.
Hence the complete demand system is
y1 = max
(
0 ; min
(
1¡ b+ a
2
+
p2 ¡ p1
2(1¡ b¡ a) ; 1
))
; (6)
y1 = max
(
0 ; min
(
1¡ a+ b
2
+
p1 ¡ p2
2(1¡ a¡ b) ; 1
))
: (7)
The two ¯rms are to choose that subgame perfect equilibrium which yields the highest
joint discounted pro¯ts. The most pro¯table outcome consists of a location pair aC ; 1¡bC
and the price pair pC1 ; p
C
2 . The subgame perfect equilibrium sustaining this outcome, when
± is su±ciently high, is as follows.
² The two ¯rms collude at pC1 ; pC2 in the marketing supergame if and only if a =
aC; b = bC has been selected in the second stage. Otherwise, if either a 6= aC or
b 6= bC has been detected, then they simply repeat the one-shot Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium resulting from the location pair a; 1¡ b .
² Once the equilibrium location decisions a = aC ; b = bC have been ovserved, then
the ¯rms play pC1 ; p
C
2 until any deviation is detected. Once a deviation is detected,
then Abreu's optimal punishment comes in e®ect.
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The next step is to examine the stability of such collusion. From the symmetric structure
of the game, it is apparent that the most pro¯table subgame perfect equilibrium must be a
symmetric pro¯le. When Abreu's optimal punishment is considered, ¯nding the optimal
punishment price pp as well as the critical threshold of the discount factor ±¤ involves
solving the following system of simultaneous equations :
¼di (p
C)¡ ¼Ci = ±¤(¼Ci ¡ ¼i(pp)) ; (8)
¼di (p
p)¡ ¼i(pp) = ±¤(¼Ci ¡ ¼i(pp)) ; (9)
where ¼C is the collusive pro¯t per ¯rm, per period, pC is the collusive price, and ¼di (p¡i)
is the pro¯t resulting from the one-shot best response against p¡i . As in Chang (1991,
1992), Ross (1992) and HÄackner (1995, 1996), we de¯ne the collusive pro¯le in terms of a
generic pair of symmetric locations aC and 1¡aC and solve the system (8)-(9) by plugging
a = b = aC into (6)-(7), to obtain pp and ±¤.
First consider item 1 of Lemma 1. The most pro¯table outcome (whether it is an
equilibrium outcome or not) in marketing is
a = b =
1
4
; p1 = p2 = s¡ 1
16
(10)
as Bonanno (1987) proves. In section 3.1 we de¯ne the sustainability condition for this
price collusion as ± ¸ ±[s] . It can be veri¯ed from (8)-(9) that ±[s] increases in the total
surplus s . In particular, ±[s] " 1
2
as s " 1. On the other hand, when aC 2
·
0;
1
4
¸
and
5
4
· s · 25
16
, the quantity sold by the deviator from the collusive price is not bound by
the upperlimit (= unity), hence the solution to (8)-(9) is
pp = ¡ (4s+ 8a
C ¡ 5)2
64(1¡ 2aC) ; ±
¤ =
(4s+ 8aC ¡ 5)2
(4s¡ 8aC + 3)2 (11)
with the deviation output
ydi (p
p) =
4((aC)2 + aC ¡ s)¡ 3
16(2aC ¡ 1) : (12)
Letting aC =
1
4
in (11) we obtain ±[s] =
µ
4s ¡ 3
4s+ 1
¶2
. Especially, ±
·
5
4
¸
=
1
9
.
Now proceed to item 2 of in Lemma 1. From (6)-(7) and (8)-(9), ±¤ strictly increases
in aC 2
·
0;
1
4
¸
given s . Hence ±[s] is the critical discount factor when aC = 0 . This
directly implies that, when ±[s] · ± < ±[s] , ¯rms locate aC and 1¡ aC such that
aC =
arg
a [±
¤ = ± j s] ; (13)
which increases in ± . In particular, ¯rms choose aC = 0 when ± = ±[s] . Plugging aC = 0
into (11), it can be veri¯ed that ±[s] =
µ
4s¡ 5
4s+ 3
¶2
. The deviation output ydi (p
p) < 1 for
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all s <
13
4
, with ±
·
5
4
¸
= 0 . For all s ¸ 13
4
; the deviation output is the entire market,
ydi (p
p) = 1 .
When ± < ±[s] , price collusion at maximum di®erentiation is unsustainable by means
of Abreu's optimal punishment. Hence item 3 of Lemma 1 comes in e®ect. When ¯rms
are unable to collude, they play the well known two-stage subgame perfect equilibrium
yielding maximum di®erentiation (d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979).
Figure 10 : Endogenous horizontal di®erentiation
(independent ventures).
-
Locations10
6
±
1
4
3
4
1
±[s]
±[s]
1
2
aC 1¡ aC
Lemma 1, item 3.
Lemma 1, item 2.
Lemma 1, item 1.
Hence, ¯rms choose to collude whenever ± ¸ ±[s] . In summary, the foregoing discussion
establishes that price collusion ensuing independent ventures becomes easier to sustain
when (i) product di®erentiation is large, and (ii) gross individual surplus s is low.
7.2 Proof of Lemma 2
In each period of the market supergame, the demand functions obtain as follows. When
q1 > q2 (which can occur only when the two ¯rms develop their products independently),
we identify the marginal willingness to pay of the consumer who is indi®erent between
buying the high-quality good and buying the low-quality good, denoted by h , and that
between buying the low-quality good and not buying at all, denoted by l , as :
h =
p1 ¡ p2
q1 ¡ q2 ; l =
p2
q2
: (14)
Hence, the demand functions are unravelled as follows:
y1 =
£¡minfh;£g
£
; y2 =
minfh;£g ¡minfl;£g
£
: (15)
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On the other hand, if the two ¯rms produce an identical quality q1 = q2 , if p1 6= p2
then whichever ¯rm charging the higher price sells nil ; otherwise if p1 = p2 they split the
market evenly, attracting
y1 = y2 =
1
2£
Ã
£¡min
(
p1
q1
;£
)!
(16)
customers each.
Under the assumption that unit variable cost of production is nil, the per period pro¯t
of ¯rm i is ¼i = piyi .
The ¯rst half of Lemma 2 can be proven through the following three steps.
Step 1 : When q1 = q2 , each ¯rm pays the innovation cost k1 . The joint pro¯t between
the two ¯rms per marketing period is
¼1 + ¼2 =
minfp1 ; p2g
£
Ã
£¡ minfp1 ; p2g
q1
!
(17)
as long as
minfp1 ; p2g
q1
· £
(see (16)). The ¯rst-order derivative
@(¼1 + ¼2)
@minfp1 ; p2g = 0
is satis¯ed at minfp1 ; p2g = £q1
2
, with which the joint pro¯t (17) increases in q1 , attaining
its maximum when q1 = q . It is straightforward to verify that the resulting joint pro¯t
¼1 + ¼2 =
minfp1 ; p2g
£
Ã
£¡ minfp1 ; p2g
q
!
is no less than the supremum of the sum of (19) over the range (18). Hence q1 = q2 = q ,
minfp1 ; p2g = £q
2
is joint pro¯t maximal.8 We assume that colluding ¯rms split the
demand evenly by setting p1 = p2 =
£q
2
.
Step 2 : We now need to prove that there is no equilibrium with q1 > q2 . By (14),
when q1 > q2 each ¯rm attracts a strictly positive demand i®
p2
q2
<
p1 ¡ p2
q1 ¡ q2 < £ : (18)
8An analogous result has been derived by Rosenkranz (1995, p. 13) in a model of vertical di®erentiation
under the assumption of full market coverage.
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Insofar as these conditions are satis¯ed, by demand functions (15), per period pro¯t
functions are
¼1 =
p1
£
Ã
£¡ p1 ¡ p2
q1 ¡ q2
!
;
¼2 =
p2
£
Ã
p1 ¡ p2
q1 ¡ q2 ¡
p2
q2
!
:
(19)
Within the range (18), the system of ¯rst-order conditions
@
@p1
(¼1 + ¼2) =
@
@p2
(¼1 + ¼2) = 0
has no interior solution. The only solution is the limiting solution on the boundary of the
range (18) :
p1 ! £q1
2
; p2 ! £q2
2
which implies that the lower quality attracts zero demand.
Step 3 : Finally, we need to ascertain that a ¯rm does not have a strict incentive to
deviate from q to a lower quality without expecting any positive demand. When both
¯rms produce q , each of them earns the discounted net pro¯t
¡k1 + ±
8(1¡ ±) £q : (20)
If a ¯rm deviates to a lower quality q¡ " , the ¯rm's net discounted pro¯t becomes simply
¡k2 , which is strictly lower than (20) under the assumption (4). Hence, the deviation is
unpro¯table.
Note also that, whenever q1 = q2 (whether they are at q or not) collusion is sustainable
if and only if ± ¸ 1
2
. This, in conjunction with above step 2, implies that item 2 in the
trichotomy preceding Lemma 2 (see section 4.1) is vacuous. This completes the proof of
the ¯rst half of Lemma 2.
On the other hand, the second half of the lemma can be proven using in part the
following Lemma 2-i.
Lemma 2-i : If ¯rms undertake independent ventures and anticipate Bertrand-Nash
competition in marketing, then any pure-strategy equilibrium must have q2 =
4
7
q1
in the second stage.
Proof : The pro¯t functions at the ¯rst stage are (cf. Choi and Shin, 1992):
¼1 =
4£q21(q1 ¡ q2)
(4q1 ¡ q2)2 ; ¼2 =
£q1q2(q1 ¡ q2)
(4q1 ¡ q2)2 :
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It can be immediately veri¯ed that, as @¼2=@q2 = 0 if q2 = 4q1=7; the solution to
the leader's problem de¯ned as
max
q1
¼1
µ
q1
¯¯¯¯
q2 =
4
7
q1
¶
is q1 = q , i.e., it coincides with the Nash best reply identi¯ed by Choi and Shin.
The remainder of the proof of the second half of Lemma 2 is to ascertain that, given
q2 =
4
7
q, ¯rm 1 does not have a strict incentive to deviate from q1 = q to q1 =
16
49
q , in
the latter case ¯rms indeed switch labels since we always refer to the higher quality ¯rm
as \¯rm 1".
If q1 = q ; q2 =
4
7
q ; then ¼1 =
7
48
£q :
If q1 =
4
7
q ; q2 =
16
49
q ; then ¼2 =
1
84
£q :
Hence the condition for no deviation is
±
1¡ ± ¢
7
48
£q ¡ k1 ¸ ±
1¡ ± ¢
1
84
£q ¡ k2 ;
which simpli¯es into
15±
112(1¡ ±) £q ¸ k1 ¡ k2 :
Obviously, this is always satis¯ed under assumption (4). This completes the proof of the
second half of Lemma 2.
7.3 Supplementary note on unilateral spillover externality
Consider the following alternative game as a thought experiment.
De¯nition : Game ¡B is a three-stage game which is identical to the vertical di®eren-
tiation game in section 4 except that, in the second stage, independent ventures are
to locate their products sequentially, ¯rm 1 ¯rst and then ¯rm 2 second, and that
the costs of product innovation for these two ¯rms are k1 and k2 respectively.
Lemma 2-ii : In Game ¡B , if ¯rms choose independent ventures and anticipateBertrand-
Nash competition in the marketing stage, then in equilibrium q1 = q and q2 = 4q=7 .
Proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 2 except that the condition (4) is no longer
relevant.
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Comparing Lemma 2-ii with Lemma 2 in section 4, the following can be veri¯ed.
Corollary iv: Whenever condition (4) is satis¯ed, the game ¡B and the vertical di®er-
entiation game described in section 4 are observationally equivalent.
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